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political evolution peculiar to party government and to democracy. Given the free platform and the free press, even with their superlatives, hyperboles and mendacities, and you have one of the most puissant of forces making for righteousness in government.

As for the honest critic of public men, he can never do injury to the State if (adapting somewhat a saying by Huxley) he makes it his aim: "To smite all humbugs, however big; to give a nobler tone to politics; to set an example of toleration for everything but lying; to be indifferent as to whether the work be recognized, so long as it is done."

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THE ETHICS OF NIETZSCHE AND GUYAU.*

I.

Nietzsche has not that supreme originality which he claims for himself. Mix Greek sophistry and Greek scepticism with the naturalism of Hobbes and the monism of Schopenhauer, corrected by Darwin and seasoned with the paradoxes of Rousseau and of Diderot, and the result will be the philosophy of Zarathoustra; although it is apparently advanced, and its form is fascinating to ingenuous youth in search of novelty, it is none the less essentially ancient and reactionary. It is hostile, in every possible sense, to all which we call modern progress. "*Modern*, that is to say false," Nietzsche reiterates in every variety of tone, and he devotes a chapter in his last work to anathematizing "*Modernity*." He fancies himself secure from the tyranny of all those prejudices which emanate from the "herd" or are due to environment; and yet no one more than this singer of the praises of force and of war has gathered

*This article will be included in a book, which is to appear soon, entitled "*Nietzsche et l'immoralisme*."

together into a single heap all the gregarious prejudices of a Germany still feudal in the midst of the nineteenth century, all those dominant ideas which spring from the race, the environment and the moment, and combined them with corresponding ideas derived from antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Whatever is most "advanced" and most "retrograde" in German thought is to be found in this singer of Zarathoustra. The whole of the German criticism of religions and of philosophies finds expression in his work in studied blasphemies and in every kind of negation; but these same negations are succeeded by enthusiastic affirmations, only the more enthusiastic the more they are devoid of proof; and the object of this enthusiasm is a conception of society which recalls the Middle Ages and a conception of the world which carries us back to ancient paganism.

Just as La Rochefoucauld attempted to account for all manifestations of spirit in terms of self-love, so does Nietzsche attempt to explain every act of man whether alone or in society by the will to be powerful and to have the mastery. Such "transmutations of values" and such transpositions of feelings are always possible and always contain a part of the truth, whatever the terms may be which are transposed. To one person the mainspring of every action is self-love, to another it is the will to live; to another it is the love of power; to another every act contains a germ of altruism; to another all is due to thought, conscious or unconscious; a passion is, to Pascal, "a precipitation of thoughts;" while to certain German psychologists it is "an unconscious reasoning," etc. Whence comes this possibility of trying so many different reductions and transvaluations in the matter of our personal and social inclinations? From the very simple fact that our feelings always embrace the whole of ourselves and with the whole diverse parts; hence in any given feeling these diverse parts can always be found. It is only necessary for us to emphasize a certain order of terms or of values for us to recognize it in all our individual and collective desires. This it was which enabled La Rochefoucauld to find everywhere an element of self-love: it is evident that man can never, even in his greatest act of

devotion to society as a whole, cease also to love himself, though it be only as a being capable of such devotion. Nietzsche finds his satisfaction in another way: that of finding everywhere the will to be powerful. The capital sins might equally well be taken in turn, and the claim made that every inward motive could be traced back to pride, or if preferred, to love of pleasure, or again to avarice, envy or indolence. Even activity would enter into indolence, because it follows the law of the *least* effort, etc. Or again the cardinal virtues might be taken, and the mainspring of action be found in each of them in turn, in prudence, in courage or in temperance. There would thus be values to suit every taste. Litterateurs and poets may take pleasure in such vague paradoxes; but the philosopher must assign to each element its exact share. Moralists in general, by which I mean literary moralists, have mingled the most subtle sophistries with their most delicate observations, and, on the whole, whether they bear the name of Montaigne, Charron, Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyère, Vanvenargues, Rivarol, Chamfort or Nietzsche have sophisticated the natural feelings of man to a marvellous extent. To the philosopher, however, every theory may be of service if he knows how to extract the truth from it. There is an element of truth in Nietzsche's analyses, and it is this: will is present everywhere and has a natural tendency to enlarge its sphere and to overcome obstacles. Thanks to this fact, already familiar to us all, Nietzsche is able to point out a struggle against obstacles and an instinct of development in every act of individual will; then passing on to the social order, he transforms, more than the facts warrant, every relation of man to his fellows into the will to rule others, to have them in subjection, to make them serve his own ends. Even in the lover, he shows a power which grows, and this often in the face of obstacles, so that to love is, in his view, once more to will to dominate, to will to be powerful. The beloved, again, has found his way into the heart of another "to steal away its strength," in some way to take advantage of it. We see from all this the easy task Nietzsche set himself: every philosopher can undertake it as well as he, after the same fashion, and

propose to himself as a theme how to unmask the will to rule, as it appears in the individual and in society.

Having adopted Schopenhauer's theory of the Will, Nietzsche combines it with Darwin's theory of the universal struggle. Individuals are the centres of will, each one aspiring to be all, to control all and to appropriate all.

But the "*bellum omnium contra omnes*" of Hobbes, becomes with Nietzsche as with Darwin, in a way a law of beneficence and a law of progress. The sufferings of the individual, the extinction of the weak to the advantage of the strong, of inferior races to the advantage of superior races—all this is to be accepted with joy and with love. This, no doubt, is the right of the strongest, but Nietzsche ends by interpreting it in the most elevated and disinterested sense, as a law whose working is for the good of the superior human or even superhuman race which selection will bring forth.

We see developed in Nietzsche all the consequences commonly drawn from Darwin, especially in Germany, by the partisans of force. He is an aristocrat and the enemy of every democracy, as are all the Darwinians who are determined to apply the Darwinian law, pure and simple, to human society. He is the enemy of socialism, which is a coalition of the weak and the miserable against this law of the strongest which is to bring about their extermination. He is no less the enemy of anarchy, because there again is hostility to authority and the rule of the strong. He is, however, the enemy of the State, and even of society, because the State and society are ruled by the "law of the herd," and their tendency is, in his opinion, to stifle individuality, especially superior individuality. The woman's movement irritates him, because he regards it as an insurrection of the weak sex against the strong. Pessimism irritates him, because he sees in it a tendency to degeneration and decadence (and in this he agrees with Guyau who has shown pessimism to be at the same time an effect and a cause of the weakening of vitality). Finally, pity, charity, solidarity, all seem to him causes of decadence.

If we accept Zarathoustra's words, "War and courage have brought about greater things than love of our neighbor. It

is not your pity, but your bravery, O warriors, which until now has saved victims." The great example which Nietzsche invokes is the foundation and the duration of the Roman empire, the object of his profoundest admiration; he never stops to ask whether the Roman empire was not founded as much or even more upon the feeling of solidarity, of devotion to the whole, than upon courage and war. If the Romans knew no "pity," they at least knew "piety" towards their country.

Nietzsche constantly sets the "noble" over against the "good." "The *noble* is determined to create something new and a new virtue. The *good* desires the old and that the old be preserved." Thanks to this definition, as arbitrary as it is aristocratic, Nietzsche is able to scoff at the good and the just, to despise them and to oppose to them pretended new "values." He has made morality the synonym of legality and blind routine, of a dormant intelligence and heart.

Nietzsche was a great spirit; but unfortunately he was a false spirit. In spite of this, however, he uttered many truths or half-truths.

II.

By what means is Nietzsche to be refuted? By himself. In his writings, rich in thought as they are, it is true he has put the poison alongside the food but he has also included the antidote. First, he lays down the will to rule as the principle of every moral and social idea; then he says to us: "Every animal, the philosophic animal, like all the rest, strives instinctively towards an *optimum* of favorable conditions in which he can best display his strength and attain to the fullness the feeling of his power; every animal has, too, an instinctive horror and yet a sort of subtle need, *superior to all reason*, of every kind of trouble and hindrance which does arise or could arise in his path towards the *optimum*—(it is not of the path towards *happiness* that I am speaking, but of the path to power, to action, to the fullest activity, which is, in truth, in most cases the path to *unhappiness*.)"* Nietzsche does not

*"Genealogie de la Morale," 3d dissertation § 7.

see that this parenthesis contained the refutation of his entire system. Was not his claim, practically, to oppose himself to the pessimism of Schopenhauer by substituting the triumphant will to be powerful for the continually defeated will to live? And now he recognizes that the development of power does not lead to happiness, but far oftener to unhappiness. How then is he to persuade humanity that the way which ends in suffering is also that which leads to the best, the *optimum*? Such an optimism is singularly pessimistic.

Nietzsche's errors in ethics come from his neglect to analyze and to fathom the idea of life, of vitality and of vital power upon which he wishes to base his doctrine of morals. Is the instinct to live, the instinct to live no matter how or in what condition? Or is it the instinct to live *more*? Or is it the instinct to live *better*? And in what does the *more* differ or not differ from the *better*? And in what does the *better* itself consist? Is it in more power or in certain quality of power? Is it in more enjoyment or in a certain quality of enjoyment? Is not the instinct to live or the instinct to be powerful, at bottom, the instinct to act, to think and to enjoy? When suffering becomes unbearable the instinct to live and to act grows weak, and to such a degree that the desire of death and actual suicide become possible.

"It is not enough," says Zarathoustra, "to increase and multiply; you must also *rise higher*." But are not the highest instincts those which are the most favorable to the growth of the life of the individual and of the species? This cannot always be said to be true with regard to the individual, since these instincts sometimes condemn the individual to be sacrificed; but it is the case with regard to the species, if it be understood that not *preservation* pure and simple be the end, but a greater *happiness*, or rather a happiness of a superior *quality*; so that we end by moving in a circle, and it still remains to determine what is superior, independently of the question whether this superior is realized in an individual or in individuals taken collectively.

Guyau is one of the predecessors of Nietzsche. The German thinker has covered with marginal notes his copies of

“L’esquisse d’une morale sans obligation ou sanction” and “l’Irreligion de l’avenir.” But Guyau does not fall into the errors of Nietzsche. If we place ourselves exclusively at the point of view of the will to live, we are obliged, as Guyau has shown, to look for the foundations of morality; first in the domain of causality, not in that of finality, in the domain of the actually existent desire, not in that of the desirable; second, in the common domain of the conscious and the unconscious, which is precisely the basis of life. Upon these foundations Guyau and Nietzsche have built up ethics without obligation or sanction; but Guyau this represents only the sub-structure in a complete system of morals.

In our opinion it is Guyau who is right. The true and definitive ethics is not a science which can seek its own proper jurisdiction merely in the region of causality; it is, by its very definition, a science of finality and even of reflective finality. Positive morals leaves on one side, says Guyau, the notion of the *desirable* and confines itself to the *ascertainment* of what in reality is *desired*, “the target constantly aimed at by humanity,” just as the geometrical centre aimed at by a rifleman is determined according to the law of the binomial, by ascertaining the distribution of bullet-holes at varying distances from the centre. But this is, definitively, to treat ethics from the point of view of *another science*, of a natural philosophy of manners. It is necessary to rise higher. Just as, in physiology it is impossible to ignore the fundamental fact of function, and in physics to ignore matter and force, so in morals we cannot ignore the fundamental notion of a deliberate and voluntary *aim*, and consequently the notion of the *desirable*. In whatever way this notion may be conceived, whether as some idea of duty or simply the ultimate satisfaction of our own nature, it cannot be entirely absorbed in the thing desired, without destroying alike morality and the object of morality. And this is what Nietzsche has done.

Similarly the moralist cannot be content to descend into the domain of the unconscious in order to find there the rule of the conscious will, that is to say, an ideal aim. To do this he must ascend to the deliberate will and explore its domain.

Nietzsche, like Guyau, takes as the principle of morals what he calls, *intensity* of life. But what is that intensity? Is it a simple affair of quantity? And if so, what measure shall we apply to it? Even if we should succeed—to suppose what is impossible—in measuring the force of life, it would still be necessary to estimate its *direction*, for upon this the wise use of force depends. The word force thus used is, besides, only a figure of speech. Psychological intensity is felt and cannot be measured; besides it is felt in regard to this or that psychological fact, not in regard to life as a whole. Is then the intensity of life a question of *quality* and of value? What further measure shall we apply? For example, has the intensity of sensations the same *value* as the intensity of thought? Has that of thought, in its turn, the same value as that of will? Doubtless at the heart of things, it is highly probable that the most truly moral life is, on the whole, the most truly intense, the most *lived*; but looking only at such facts as can be seen and tested, if the greatest intensity usually involves the greatest expansion of life, it does not always involve its generous expansion in regard to others. The ethics of life is, with Nietzsche as with Guyau, an ethics of intensity and of vital expansion, but results in totally different consequences. Although these consequences may be insufficiently justified, they prove none the less the uncertainty of intensity as a criterion when the attempt is made to apply it *in concreto*.

Miss Simcox, in a theory analogous to that of Guyau, endeavors to reduce natural good to “the greatest possible abundance and the greatest possible variety of vital power.” In other words, it is “the possession of abundant and fully developed faculties, both active and passive, the exercise of which is orderly and equal.” But, in the first place, in what does this *order* of the faculties consist, which supposes the subordination of the inferior to the superior? Again, how are we to recognize superior faculties? It will be answered, “among all the possibilities of combination, that which *harmonizes* the greatest *number* of the *strongest* tendencies must be given the preference.” The important thing, then, is always to know which are the strongest tendencies. They are, it is said,

those which result by heredity from modes of conduct which have already had the greatest strength and the most success among our ancestors; these modes of conduct are precisely those which tend to the preservation and development of society. Man feels the pressure upon his individual will of all the unknown series of natural motives, which, on the whole, have urged his ancestors oftenest in a good rather than a bad direction. This is what Guyau had already said: "The moral agent," he wrote, "will feel himself pushed in this direction, by an entirely natural and rational tendency, and will recognize that there must be a sort of inward *coup d'état* for him to escape from this pressure: it is that *coup d'état* which is called a fault or a crime." But the very possibility of such a *coup d'état* proves that the tendencies which should be the strongest are not always so. The criterion is, then, overthrown. Further the *coup d'état* in question—crime—appears to Nietzsche to be itself that which is the best, the "healthiest" the most fully in accord with the will to be powerful. In order to avoid this objection, Miss Simcox is obliged to define the strongest tendencies: they are, "those which are most *persistent*." She thus goes back to Darwin's theory of permanent instincts, the momentary violation of which cannot prevent their final reappearance in the form of remorse. But, as Guyau showed us before Nietzsche, these persistent tendencies of the species include immoral or at least non-moral tendencies as well as moral tendencies. The instinct of vengeance, for instance, is very *persistent*, especially among the Corsicans: Nietzsche would see in this a splendid manifestation of life. The love of property and even the desire for the goods of others are also very permanent tendencies. Nietzsche well says: "If the master is able to appropriate the goods and the person of his slave, this is according to nature." It would be necessary to draw up a list of tendencies in the order of their permanency in the species, which is not easy; and were this list actually made out, we should always ask, as Nietzsche does, why it is required that the individual should sacrifice his *strongest* tendency to that which is most *permanent* in the entire *species*, or even to the most permanent tendency in himself. Besides there is one

tendency preëminently enduring in the individual, as in the species: self-love. If everything is to give way to self-love, as Stirner demands, and also Nietzsche himself, there is no question that we are acting in accordance with an enduring and indestructible tendency, which always reappears and always will reappear. It is, then, when man is not selfish, when he does not regard himself as "unique," that he should chiefly suffer "remorse."

Finally, if we examine still more closely the strongest and the most permanent tendencies of the species—the residue in us of the actions of our ancestors—we recognize in them by that very fact the survivors and the signs of an *antecedent* condition of human nature. Hence to follow these tendencies is to go forward putting our feet in those places where our ancestors have left the deepest and most perceptible impressions. By doing this we only *keep on* in the same path as our ancestors; the one ideal is then to do again what the herd has done. Now, such an ideal as this does not necessarily include the idea of progress, nor even of evolution; the purely evolutionary ethics of life, instead of making us turn towards the future would end by making us keep our faces turned towards the past. To avoid this objection we must find tendencies, which, while they sum up the results of the past, also anticipate the future; but let these tendencies once be separated, in theory, from the others, and the reason why the individual should submit to them still remains to be found. Morals cannot, then, be a pure question of dynamics, a simple problem of *forces*, even if these be conceived of as intensity of inward power. The "will to be powerful" remains under all its forms, an indeterminate principle.

More recently M. Simmel has borrowed afresh a moral criterion from the idea of a quantitative maximum for which he gives three successive formulas: Do that which, directly or indirectly produces: 1st, the maximum of a satisfied will; 2d, the maximum of life; 3d, the maximum of activity. The analogy between these principles and those of Guyau in regard to the most intensive and the most extensive life has been justly commented upon. But the principle of Guyau did not

embrace the category of quantity alone: Guyau demanded "fecundity" of life, its "expansion" and "centrifugal direction" as well. Quantity in the rough meant to him only "power" to which "order" should be added, that is an organization of power in view of some end to be attained. This end always remains to be determined.

In order to attain it, have we nothing to do but to give ourselves up to the movement of life, as Nietzsche wishes, and shall all ethics hold literally to these two sayings: *Sequere naturam*, or, if you will: *sequere vitam*? No, because life, whether it be individual or social, contains the germ of discord as well as the germ of concord. One of the capital laws which biological evolution has brought to light, and upon which Nietzsche has laid special emphasis is precisely the "struggle for life." We have seen that this struggle does not prevent harmony in life: it is this which Guyau has shown, it is this which Nietzsche has too often forgotten. The struggle may also depend more upon the circumstances of environment, than upon the essential nature of the life itself, notwithstanding Nietzsche's opinion to the contrary. But as there will always be a material environment and material necessities for human activity, the struggle will always go on upon certain points, and will involve in the future, as it has always done in the past, a state of more or less open warfare between opposing interests, a conflict of egoistic tendencies with those which are disinterested. Now the object of morals is precisely peace, agreement, harmony. Morals should then set over against the actual life, mixture of struggle and agreement that it is, an *ideal* life, which is not for this reason in contradiction to the other as Nietzsche claims; on the other hand, neither is it simply such a life as that which abandons itself to purely *vital* impulses. The *natural* direction of life which Nietzsche alone takes into account is one thing; the *ideal* and *moral* direction which we should impress upon it by a deliberate act of the will is quite another thing. If morality consisted of nothing more than living, we should all be moral; the misfortune is that in certain cases morality consists in dying.

If man is to make progress in a truly moral sense he must

not be preoccupied merely with a stronger, more persistent and more intense life, but with a life more disinterested and more universal; hence he must constantly place the intensity of life in its extension *towards others*, that is to say, the quantity in the quality and the value. This it is to which Guyau invited him: he sees the genuinely intense life in the generous and fruitful life, which "lives for many others" and it was thus he lived himself. But this entire harmony of intensity with expansiveness exists only in great souls; in others it is imperfectly *realized*. As a result of evolution man in becoming man has still remained an animal, and one of the laws of animality which will always persist in the multitude is the struggle for life. The biological theory of evolution has widened the horizon of the struggle without changing its nature. It cannot, alone, transform all purely vital relations into moral ones, any more than the telescope can make the field of vision go beyond the relations of objects in space, by opening it up to the stars. Besides we have seen that Nietzsche, in the name of life, simply and entirely does away with morality.

Guyau himself had very plainly marked the limit which the doctrine of evolution can not overstep, nor even attain. This limit is, according to him, "devotion, sacrifice." How indeed shall the ethics of life set about obtaining from the individual, in certain cases, a sacrifice, which is not merely partial and provisional, but definitive and without compensation? "Charity," says Guyau, "urges us to forget what our right hand has given, but reason counsels us to look well to what it gives." The three psychological equivalents of duty in the doctrine of life, according to Guyau—expansive activity, expansive intelligence, expansive sensibility—are valuable supports for morality, but for a double use. Doubtless ever-increasing solidarity does tend, as Guyau has shown, to do away with the conflict between each individual and the whole. But this universality of love, this complete fusion of the sensibilities which would make duty useless is still only an ideal: in actual reality we are yet in the thick of the struggle, and there will always be Nietzsches to remind us of it. The autonomy between the good of the individual and the good of the whole does then

often exist in fact; and Guyau has shown this in the second part of his "Esquisse." This autonomy is not resolved in the present by dismissing its solution to an indefinite and problematical future as does Spencer. The ideal must be our rule of action not because it will be real to-morrow, but because this ideal has for the individual to-day a value superior to his personal happiness and to his personal *life*.

III.

Finally, according to both Guyau and Nietzsche, the idea of life remains ambiguous, because it has two distinct spheres: that of the outer world and that of consciousness. From the physical point of view, life is only a mechanism, more complex than any other, in that it is able to renew itself and to make itself a kind of centre of a cartesian whirlpool; but it is always a mechanism, as Descartes well understood. Hence from this side a doctrine of morals cannot be built up. All that can be said is that, even in its mechanical aspect, life is essentially a construction although always accompanied by that destruction which was almost all that Nietzsche saw. The practical problem of life, physically considered, is to establish a balance between construction and destruction to the advantage of the former. This is, however, only the material side of life. In point of fact that which constitutes the essence of life is the inward not the outward; it is the inner activity with the more or less confused sensibility which goes along with it. In other words, it is the *psychological* basis which is of importance, and which alone can enlighten us as to true moral "values." Now, from the psychological point of view, the doctrine of Nietzsche is as we have seen only the old theory of an unconquerably egoistic will, of an ineluctable self-concentration. La Rochefoucauld and Helvetius were among the French masters of Nietzsche. But contemporary psychology has refuted this theory of pure egoism and has shown that altruism is also essential to life, that it too is fundamental and primordial. The Darwinian mechanism of selection which makes those triumph who are best adapted to their environ-

ment, expresses a physiological law of nature, which no doubt has its application to human society; but this is only one of the laws of action in the real world. Psychological laws are entirely different; neither can sociological laws be reduced to the selection of the strongest, nor to a mere struggle for power. The Nietzschean interpretation of Darwinism, as a morality of masters and slaves, is incomplete and false. The same is true of another Nietzschean view, which, as with Rolph, leads to "an insatiable thirst for power," without defining in what power consists, why it is exercised and upon what. Nietzsche reared a complete metaphysic and an entire epic poem upon this narrow basis which is only a fragment of the truth. Far from being the foundation of a truly scientific system of ethics, the metaphysic of Nietzsche is, on the contrary, a negation of those laws which are the most firmly established by a genuinely *scientific and philosophic* biology and sociology. His unbridled individualism is in manifest contradiction to that idea of solidarity which is becoming more and more dominant in the eyes of both biologists and sociologists. The German thinker saw only one of the great laws of nature, that of division and opposition; he did not see the other and more fundamental one: that of union and harmony.

After this examination of the teachings of Guyau and Nietzsche our conclusion is that the idea of morality ought not to be in hopeless opposition to nature itself and to life; the end to be pursued should not be in contradiction to the cause which is to realize it; there should be what Guyau calls a "coincidence" between finality and causality. In order to be possible, the reconciliation of individual and universal ends, which is the proper object of ethics, should not be absolutely contrary to the very nature of man, to the essential tendency of the human will. The ideal, which is the harmony of the individual with the whole, must first have some foundation in reality; without this it would not be what we call a force-idea, it would be a pure utopia only to be realized by miracle and supernatural grace. The possibility of a system of morals demands, then, that the ideal be already realized in part by man, that there shall actually be in us a point of junction be-

tween the ideal and the real, whence the harmony already begun may be further carried on; it is necessary that the fusion of the individual and the universal be already accomplished in the very centre of our being, in the *punctum saliens*, so that it may radiate there and invade little by little the entire man. In a word, it is necessary that the individual himself have, I do not say only a "social side" as Comte and Guyau have admitted, but even a universal centre. The ethics to come will then only be able to subsist as true ethics, if it succeed in putting beyond doubt a principle of universal disinterestedness immanent in the individual himself and identical with the radical will of mankind.

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THE PROFESSIONAL CRIMINAL IN ENGLAND.

IN a series of articles on Crime which a late Assistant Commissioner of Police for London has been contributing to the press he appeals to men of experience in support of his proposals for treating the criminal classes with greater rigor and severity. My experience of the criminal population, it is true, is of a different character from the experience of an official whose business it has been to hunt them down, to collect evidence against them, to secure their conviction before the criminal courts and to see them safely lodged for months in prison or for years in penal servitude. An occupation such as this, necessary as it is for the protection of society, is too restricted in its operations—too much dominated by a single point of view to give the men who follow it that wide and comprehensive outlook on the criminal problem so essential for its adequate solution. It is almost inevitable that an official whose duty it has been to track out and hunt down the supposed offender should ultimately come to regard him (to use the words of one of the articles) as "a human beast of prey." It fell to my lot as a prison official to come into the closest contact day